Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 13, 1996 Volume 8 : Issue 73 ISSN 1004-042X Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu) News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu) Archivist: Brendan Kehoe Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala Ian Dickinson Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest CONTENTS, #8.73 (Sun, Oct 13, 1996) File 1--Selling OverSeas Encryption (fwd) File 2--AA BBS (Robert Thomas) Appeal Turned Away File 3--A cypherpunk responds to Time File 4--Re: White House Clipper 3.1.1 plan unveiled File 5--Private censorship vs. free speech, from 10/96 IU File 6--Scam spam? File 7--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 Apr, 1996) CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION ApPEARS IN THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 22:19:59 -0400 (EDT) From: Noah Subject: File 1--Selling OverSeas Encryption (fwd) From -Noah ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date--Wed, 2 Oct 1996 12:38:47 -0400 (EDT) From--Anthony Williams Administration to ease export of encryption software October 1, 1996 Posted at: 3:15 p.m. EDT WASHINGTON (AP) -- The Clinton administration intends to break a deadlock between law enforcement and the U.S. computer industry with a plan announced Tuesday to make it easier for companies to sell powerful data-scrambling software abroad. Companies could export such technology as long as they have a system in place that would allow U.S. law enforcement officials -- after getting a court order -- to break the code in order to intercept communications. President Clinton will sign an executive order instituting the plan in the middle of October, said Greg Simon, Vice President Al Gore's domestic policy adviser. The plan "will make it easier for Americans to use stronger encryption products -- whether at home or aboard -- to protect their privacy, intellectual property and other valuable information," Gore said in a statement. "It will support the growth of electronic commerce, increase the security of the global information and sustain the economic competitiveness of U.S. encryption product manufacturers," he added. The plan changes U.S. export policy and affirms current U.S. import policy, which places no restrictions on the sale of encryption devices within the U.S. The plan mirrors a proposal by the administration this summer. That proposal, considered more acceptable to industry, has been criticized by a number of computer trade groups and computer user groups. At issue is sophisticated software that allows users to scramble telephone and computer messages that move across computer networks and the Internet. Users, particularly businesses, want to keep their data private while law enforcement officials argue they need the power to unscramble the messages to investigate crime. "Law enforcement has been arguing that this is critical to their continued operations. But virtually everyone else, from industry to the civil liberties community, has opposed these proposals," said Marc Rotenberg, director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. While the technology is sold domestically, the U.S. State Department has blocked efforts to export it, although foreign firms sell their software around the world. Under the most recent White House plan, U.S. companies could export the software that scrambles -- or encrypts -- data using codes that are up to 56 bits long, Rotenberg said. As it stands, codes may only be 40 bits long in exported software. Bits are the electronic pulses that make up the data being transmitted. In return, U.S. companies would have to design a system that would allow intelligence officials to get the code if they obtain a court warrant. The plan also would transfer authority over encryption export from the State Department to the Commerce Department, but it would give the FBI power to review export plans. This plan replaces the "clipper chip" the Clinton administration proposed in 1994. That would have allowed computer or telephone communications to be scrambled while giving the government a set of decoding keys to allow for court-approved electronic surveillance. The latest plan is different than the clipper chip because it would make it more difficult for government to unscramble messages, government officials say. The keys could be held by third parties and their components would be spread across several companies. The administration believes it will take some time for the United States to persuade other countries to adopt the same systems, allowing governments to work together. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 7 Oct 1996 19:10:31 -0700 From: "baby-X @ cyberPOLIS" Subject: File 3--A cypherpunk responds to Time (Fwd from: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu Recently Time, which from what I've read had a role in founding this list, printed an article about the cypherpunks. I had some comments, which I have inserted. You may forward this [unmodified, please & within the bounds of good netiquet] to other appropriate fora if you like. I have not sent it to cypherpunks because it is obvious to them, but this article cried out for rebuttal, otherwise, combined with cypherpunk's somewhat perjorative suffix, it could produce unwarranted post election nastiness. JMR ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Time, October 14, 1996, p. 78. The Netly News Joshua Quittner Big Brother vs. Cypherpunks Well, at least they got the headline right. For more than three years, the White House and the U.S. computer industry have sat locked, eyeball to eyeball, in a seemingly intractable face-off over who will control the secret codes that protect our most sensitive communications. The government claimed to be working to protect us from nuke-carrying terrorists; the computer industry said it was championing the individual's right to privacy. Neither was telling the whole truth. [As if Time (!) were somehow an arbiter of the truth.] Last week, in a concession to Silicon Valley, the Administration blinked -- or perhaps it merely winked. Fittingly, in the arcane world of code making and breaking, it's difficult to ferret out who's doing what to whom. And why. Translation: "It requires journalism." Someone else commented: "Oh my, you mean different sides of a controversial topic are saying different things? What's a po reporter to do?" A few things are incontrovertible. Vice President Al Gore announced the new encryption initiative at midweek, timed to coincide with support from an alliance of high-tech businesses that included such hardware heavyweights as IBM, Sun Microsystems and Hewlett-Packard. However, most of the big software makers -- and every civil liberties group -- still opposed it. Gosh, what a surprise. Some individuals out there don't trust the government with an ability to decrypt our private communications in almost-realtime. Why would people _ever_ feel that way? At the core of the initiative is a new code-making scheme known as "key recovery." Here at last, the government and its supporters claimed, was a way to get around the more noxious aspects of the reviled Clipper chip, the Administration's first doomed attempt to balance the industry's call for stronger encryption with law enforcement's need to surveil our shadier citizens. According to Vice President Gore's announcement, this "key recovery" was an export-only proposal, and supposedly U.S. citizens are still to be free to use any encryption algorithm they wish, just as we are now. Therefore, I fail to see what, if anything, it could have to do with the U.S. surveiling the communications of "our shadier citizens." Unless, of course, the government was lying about their Key Recovery Assurance Program [K.R.A.P.] which they are pushing to replace their now-discredited Newspeak of "key 'escrow'" GAK [Government Access to Keys] program. I can see it now: "I'm from the government, and I'm here to help you recover your key." HINT: If you want to be able to recover your key after your hard drive crashes, copy it onto a floppy disk and write-protect it. Clipper, as proposed, would use a powerful encryption [Wrong, unless "Powerful" now means "compromised long-ago by Matt Blaze."] formula to encode communications sent over telephones and computer networks but would require that a "back door" key be built into each chip that would give police -- where warranted, of course -- a means to eavesdrop. Oh, "of course." We all know how much cops and judges respect the warrant process and the 4th amendment these days. Drugwar Uber Alles, after all. Nobody -- especially foreign companies -- liked the idea of the U.S. and its agents holding those keys. The new key-recovery proposal tries to get around that objection by chopping the keys into several pieces and storing them with "trusted agents" of the user's choosing. Some nice Swiss banks, perhaps. Time knows that "nice Swiss banks" are unlikely to get a license to be the trusted agents of users' choosing. Time also knows that few terrorists -- dumb as terrorists often are -- will actually be stupid enough to leave a copy of their crypto-key with the FBI. What Time knows and what Time will admit are, of course, two entirely different things. But the Administration's plan still falls short of what civil libertarians, and especially a vocal group of cryptoextremists who call themselves cypherpunks, say I suppose it is a distressing sign of the absolute pervasiveness of media-bias that I am now beginning to get used to various whining liars calling me an "extremist." It used to upset me, but now I call them "whining liars" and they call me an extremist. I have yet to hear an answer from the whining liars to my question: "What's so extreme about wanting a return to respect for the principles outlined in the United States Constitution?" ... I'm not holding my breath... they need: encryption powerful enough to give back to the citizenry the right to absolute privacy, which we have lost in the information age. According to the cypherpunks, the so-called 56-bit code the Administration has okayed for export can be cracked by the National Security Agency's supercomputers in a matter of hours. Wrong again, Josh. It may seem an awful lot like work or journalism or something, but perhaps next time before writing about the cypherpunks you might want to actually interview one or two of us. The "matter of hours" you refer to is almost certainly either a matter of "minutes" or "seconds" regarding 56-bit single DES (understandably, the NSA does not publicly disclose their exact capabilities with regard to cryptography). Are they right? It's hard to know whom to believe in this cloak-and-dagger debate. Civil libertarians tend to gloss over the fact that the world is full of bad people with crimes to hide. Nope, we constantly are made aware of this reality by folks who disagree with us. Cypherpunks just maintain that the world is increasingly full of *governments*, which also have "bad people with crimes to hide" (believe it or not, Josh) and therefore we don't trust governments with our secrets. The software industry -- which makes 48% of its profit overseas -- Obvious evidence of software industry evil here, at least if you listen to Pat Buchanan and Ro$$ Perot. Imagine, they make overseas profits -- how *dastardly* of that slimy software industry. is clearly less concerned with privacy than with losing foreign sales. Well, arguably the individuals running those companies embracing KRAP feel that way, but trying to characterize an entire industry full of individuals as all thinking in one way says more about Time's prejudices than I ever could. And it may be no accident that the Administration chose to start making concessions the same week an influential software CEO -- Netscape's Jim Barksdale -- excoriated Clinton's cryptopolicy and endorsed Bob Dole. 56-bit GAK is not a very much of a "concession," and this is not the first time Netscape has made statements against the idiotic U.S. export laws. Mr. Barksdale may, however, be buying a pig in a poke by endorsing Mr. Dole, who has yet to be pinned down by the media covering him on exactly how he feels about GAK. His campaign statements are contradictory on the subject of cryptography and privacy vs "the legitimate needs of law enforcement," and he's going to lose the election in a landslide if the English odds are to be believed, but I can predict how he would behave if he won -- Yep, just like Clinton. The issue is too complex -- and too important -- for political gamesmanship. Evidently, the issue is too complex for some reporters and editors, too. It will never get sorted out until somebody starts playing it straight. Might I suggest that Time begin? ----- Read the Netly News daily at netlynews.com on the World Wide Web [End] Sift through cypherpunks at toad.com -- if you can withstand the deluge. [Filtering software suggested.] Thanks to JQ. & thanks also to JYA :) JMR ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 9 Oct 1996 01:11:29 -0700 From: Michael Kwun Subject: File 4--Re: White House Clipper 3.1.1 plan unveiled (I feel like, out of habit, that I'm required to quote part of Richard's email, so I'm quoting L, M and N--the conclusions--below) Tech wars: first of all, the police are going to need to build quite an outrageous battering ram to beat down, say, PGP. This is inherent in the asymmetric nature of multiplication/factoring technology. Absent a nicely fundamental discovery in mathematics (which probably will come sometime, but it's a tough problem), building a stronger house (ie doing more multiplication) is substantially simpler than building a bigger battering ram (ie doing more factoring). That is, PGP stacks the tech wars decidedly in favor of the cypherpunks. Those Amendments: they only protect us insofar as we are able to identify when they are broken. If the feds spy on groups and decide which ones to harass (oops, conduct further surveillance on) based on illegal seized information due to their ability to crack Clipper, that's often going to be difficult to identify. (and actually protection under the 4th Amendment is getting weaker with each passing year anyway--I see no reason to weaken the protections the 4th Amendment was intended to protect, IMHO, any further with Clipper and the like). Anonymity: The right to anonymity is fairly well enshrined in First Amendment jurisprudence. The Clipper system, while it may not directly impinge on that right in many circumstances, arguably chills it considerably. (That's a pretty weak argument, as is, but I think it is the kernal of a pretty strong argument, at least if you agree with standard First Amendment jurisprudence.) An analogy: would we be comfortable, if the technology existed, if mind-reading taps were surgically implanted in all people under U.S. jurisdiction if (1) someone with the right secret code could access a person's thoughts without them knowing it; and (2) a Clipper-esque escrow system were set up to keep the secret codes from being misused? (use of these taps, under the right circumstances, could provide incontrovertible evidence as to whether or not criminal intent existed--crucial to sucessful prosecution of most criminal charges.) This system could be supported, it seems to me, using Richard's analysis of Clipper. A different sort of hypothetical: consider a proposal that if the police, in the investigation of a possible crime, come across an encoded message (on paper, not electronic). They are able to show (1) probably cause the the unencoded contents would lead to evidence proving D committed the crime; and (2) that D can decode the message. If D refuses to decode it, why not allow that to be considered evidence of D's guilt? I think the policy reasons for this sort of legal doctrine are pretty much the same as the ones Richard brings up. Michael At 12:45 PM -0500 10/8/96, Richard MacKinnon wrote: >L. Tech wars. Okay, let's postpone J and K for a moment. Let's say that >we have gotten to the point that we all need to build big, strong houses to >protect us from each other and the police (sheesh--what kind of mess have we >gotten ourselves into!!?). The police are a well-funded institution. >Eventually, they will build a big-enough battering ram and you're gonna help >pay for it. Maybe you'll do it because you're not closely following the >morass of legislation. Maybe you'll do it because someone stole your stuff >and you'll want it back. But now that the police have a big-enough >battering ram, the rest of us are gonna want to build even bigger and >stronger houses. It's an escalating war of technology, and frankly, I don't >think we can win. In fact, I don't think we should even get into it. Let's >go back to J. > >M (the letter formerly known as J). This distrust of the police concerns >me. On this point, Mike Godwin shouted at me at the former High Times >restaraunt and smart drink bar in Austin. He said that I was naive. I told >him that I used to be a cop. He told me that I should know better. He >pressed me to reveal if I had known any crooked cops. Sigh. I know what >he's getting at. Of course, I'm concerned with bad law enforcement and bad >jurisprudence. But I still value the social contract which means using >police to help me protect myself from you. I simply don't have the time to >protect myself from the police as well. In fact, I don't want to protect >myself from the police. I don't even want to encourage that line of thinking. > >N. I don't think we should build police-proof houses. We should build >houses which assist the police in their lawful duties. If there's a problem >with police carrying out their lawful duties then we should deal with THAT >problem directly. Why not use our money and resources to monitor *them* >rather than build fancy toys which prevents them from monitoring us? The >maintenance of a professional, dedicated, and trustworthy police force is >essential to the execution of our social contract. Conceding that the >police that police do not possess these characteristics and operating with >that mindset is a doomed cause for our civilization. Allowing such a police >force to continue is a nightmare. Crypto-tech vis a vis the police is a red >herring. If the problem is letter J, then we have bigger fish to fry. ------------------------------ Date: Tue, 8 Oct 1996 18:09:29 -0500 From: Declan McCullagh Subject: File 5--Private censorship vs. free speech, from 10/96 IU (Fwd from: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu Solveig Bernstein from the Cato Institute and I have opposing pieces on "private censorship" in the October issue of _Internet Underground_ magazine, in their Flamethrower column. (http://www.underground-online.com/) And, as a bit of a plug, the magazine's cover story for this month is an exclusive interview with John Draper of Cap'n Crunch fame -- who now is a sad and pitiful figure. -Declan ********* INTERNET UNDERGROUND October 1996 http://www.underground-online.com/ --- FLAMETHROWER Declan McCullagh (declan@well.com) Far from being the saviors of the Net, corporations may be the ruin of cyberspace. Let's be clear: governments have done plenty to harm the Net. By passing the Communications Decency Act (CDA), the U.S. Congress extended television-style censorship to the Net. Other countries are close behind. But governments aren't the worst of the cybercensors -- the CDA has been declared unconstitutional and netizens are organizing internationally. Private businesses pose the more sinister threat to free expression online. Take America Online (AOL), which now boasts over six million members. In a move akin to the paranoid antics of a kindergarten schoolmarm, AOL this summer started deleting messages posted in Spanish and Portuguese since its monitors can't understand them. Undercover AOL cops continue to yank accounts of mothers who talk about breast feeding and mention the word "nipple." The company's gapingly broad "terms of service" agreement allows it to boot anyone, anytime, for any reason. Or consider private universities. Carnegie Mellon University bans sexually-explicit Usenet newsgroups -- including innocuous ones devoted to Japanese anime -- and "offensive" comments posted online. Cornell University forced students who offended campus feminists with an email satire to plea-bargain to "voluntary" punishment. Brigham Young University disciplines students for downloading porn. Don't forget net-filtering software. While busily touting itself as anti-censorship, CyberSitter quietly blocks the National Organization of Women and Queer Resources Directory web sites. CyberPatrol prevents teen pornhounds from investigating animal and gun rights pages -- and, inexplicably, the Electronic Frontier Foundation's censorship archive. NetNanny cuts off AIDS resources including the sci.med.aids and clari.tw.health.aids newsgroups. SurfWatch bans domestic partner web pages and Columbia University's award-winning "Health Education and Wellness" site. Now, I don't dispute that state censorship is more heinous. The government has guns, police, and gallows to back up its laws. Anyone caught violating the CDA gets slammed with a $250,000 fine and two years in Club Fed. But to focus exclusively on the evils of government censorship is myopic. Private censorship also shrinks the marketplace of ideas, a concept California recognized when it passed a law striking down private speech codes at universities. That's why considering only the "speech rights" of businesses without looking at the effects the *exercise* of the rights have is bonkers. It ignores the very real effects of private censorship online -- which is more insidious and harder to combat. And perhaps getting worse. PUBLIC SQUARES IN CYBERSPACE People claim the street as theirs on two occasions: to protest and to celebrate. Throughout the history of the United States, there always have been readily available public spaces where people can assemble freely. In lawyerspeak, these spaces are "public forums" and aren't subject to content-based censorship. The only restrictions the state may impose, such as a requirement for a permit, must be unrelated to the protesters' message. People can scream "U.S. out of Vietnam," "legalize child pornography," or any politically explosive message they choose. Where will the public squares exist in 21st century cyberspace? Nowhere. Cyberspace is and likely will continue to be controlled by corporations. Unlike in meatspace, there is no public forum for controversial expression that offends the multinationals that jointly own the Net. Sure, it's trivial to shift your embattled web site from one Internet service provider to another. Right now, at least. In Canada, Marc Lemire didn't find it so easy when his "White Nationalist" site was kicked off of a number of ISPs in quick succession. (The Simon Wiesenthal Center has been busy firing off terse letters to Lemire's ISPs -- and clamoring for government crackdowns as well.) USENET flamer and outspoken homophobe Fred Cherry keeps losing email accounts. This problem will become acute if the small number of Internet backbone providers like MCI and Sprint -- which number only in the single digits -- buckle to public pressure from groups like the Wiesenthalers and refuse to provide connections to ISPs that host controversial web sites. If that happens, netizens will find their rosy vision of the Net as the birthplace of a new form of democracy overwhelmed by the sad reality of a new media oligarchy aborning. ******************* FLAMETHROWER By Solveig Bernstein (sberns@cato.org) The decision to remain silent is an act of conscience, just like the decision to speak. So the view that acts of "private censorship" violate rights of free speech is incoherent. If an online service provider ousts a Web site that posts explicit messages about sex, in violation of the terms of their service contract, or a non-profit organization persuades some Internet Service Providers to refuse to host "Holocaust Revisionist" web sites, these decisions do not violate rights of free speech. Indeed, such private content selection decisions are themselves acts of free speech. They are just like a newspaper editor's decision not to run a certain letter to the editor, or a publisher's decision not to publish a certain book. The editor and publisher have created a means of distributing speech. The outlet they have created is their property, and they have the right to decide what to do with it. Other private companies in the speech distribution business are no different. Private content selection has the superficial feel of government censorship. But it's dangerous to confuse the two. To see what can happen, let's accept the premise that a private company that refuses to provide a forum for speech violates the would-be speaker's free speech rights. This is a very serious charge. Assuming government exists for some legitimate purpose, it surely exists to protect our rights. If the ISP or OSP mentioned above is violating someone's rights, it logically follows that the government should take action against them. First, this means that the government would become responsible for overseeing the distribution of computer network content. Clearly, this is not a very good idea. Second, fortunately, it's fundamentally incompatible with the First Amendment. The Supreme Court recognizes that "[t]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." And the right to refrain from speaking includes the right not to provide a forum for other speakers (a misguided case or two to the contrary notwithstanding). Any premise that lead us towards more government control over computer networks should be questioned. Where does the notion that private content selection violates free speech rights come from? Often, it stems from the view that we have rights to speech because "more speech is good." On this view, free speech rights float out in the ether, with no connection any other aspect of our world, and come into play whenever we need "more speech." But free speech rights are nothing like that. They're just another aspect of property rights, and only extend as far as property rights. Free speech doesn't mean I have the right to walk into my neighbor's house to make a speech, or write an essay, however enlightened, on the wall of an office building. Another fallacy behind the premise is the view that free speech rights come into play against anyone who has a lot of power over anyone else. And, the theory goes, ISPs and OSPs just have too much power. They might, in some very hypothetical unlikely future, turn into monopolists. This argument also goes too far, too fast, in the wrong direction. ISPs and OSPs don't have any more power over authors than the New York Times, or any big publishing house. Most parents have even more power over their children. These kind of power relationships are a necessary and natural part of life; anyone who has something we want or need will have power over us. This doesn't mean that if someone is exercising that power, he or she is violating our rights. A theory of rights that aims to do away with these power relationships is fundamentally unrealistic; it's ultimate aim would have to be to abolish reality itself. By contrast, it is both necessary and proper to expect rights to provide a line of defense against the kind of power uniquely exercised by government -- the power of soldiers and police. So, we might criticize private content selection decisions as intolerant. We could point out that suppressing "revisionist" nonsense about the Holocaust might backfire, and that the truth should be brought out in open discussion. We might point out that overly restrictive ISPs and OSPs will lose customers. But none of this has anything to do with rights of "free speech" protected against true censorship by the First Amendment. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 2 Oct 1996 12:55:17 -0400 (EDT) From: "I G (Slim) Simpson" Subject: File 6--Scam spam? I don't know if this information is CUD material, but I thought I smelled a scam and decided to send this in. On Monday, 30 September I received some spam advertising a 'we'll scan your picture for you (only US$8.95)' from CB256@aol.com. The only headers were From:; Subject:; and Date:. The only contact information was a snail mail address to receive your money and the address of the company's web page (www.jet.laker.net/fastfoto). I don't like spam so I sent a I HATE SPAM message to CB256@aol.com. It got bounced; no such address! Ho Ho, says I. I went into the web site and found the same stuff as had been in the e-mail message; but no e-mail address, no phone number, no fax number, just the same surface mail address to send your money to. To be kind, maybe the folks at Fastfoto of Pomano Beach, Florida, are just very poor business people. Maybe they just forgot to include electronic contact information. May the shortened header was an attempt to save bandwidth. I didn't send any money. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 22:51:01 CST From: CuD Moderators Subject: File 7--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 Apr, 1996) Cu-Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. 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