From: keithk@guvax.acc.georgetown.edu Newsgroups: alt.folklore.urban Subject: Legal Loopholes Examples (long) Date: 13 Feb 94 15:26:30 -0500 In article <14.19259.842.0NAC57A8@select.infi.net>, ed.hackett@select.infi.net (Ed Hackett) writes: [...] > The po-lice had arrested a serial murderer. Caught him red handed so to speak. > He was released by a commielib, bleeding heart judge on a "technicality," seems > his "rights" were violated during the arrest. > > It occurred to me that this kind of thing has become an UL. Everyone's heard of > cases like this one. > > Is there any basis in fact for these UL's? The "technicality" in question usually turns out to be some really obscure point of law like the Fifth Amendment. Some of those commie-symp judges expect a red-blooded patriotic street cop, risking their life everyday to keep scum off the streets so decent folk can sit at home and read their Bibles in peace not to mention the low pay and the abuse they have to take from long-hairs and draft dodgers some of those punks look like they haven't bathed in weeks you can't tell the boys from the girls they all take drugs and do other things I can't even mention call it "Free Love" my god love used to be a beautiful thing between a man and a woman and god and their minister and their country club now they're even talkin' 'bout stuff like from Sodom and Gomorrah makes me sick what are we coming to, to remember things like the Constitution. Cases do get thrown out on procedural matters, but not as a kind of reward for "violation of your rights". Improperly obtained confessions, evidence seized in violation of that pesky old Amendment against unlawful searches and seizures, unjustified arrests, etc (etc, etc! ...) can result in the evidence in question being thrown out, which makes it harder to get a conviction or may result in charges being withdrawn. A case may get thrown out entirely if the only judtification for the charges themselves was illegaly acquired. But just demonstrating that a violation occurred is not a "Get Out of Jail" card. Many examples exist; I give a few below to illustrate where these so-called "technicalities" come from. *Note that this discussion turns entirely on US law; I include it in the presumption that our non-US friends are eternally fascinated with us and our legal system.* The most famous rulings are from cases overturned on appeal, which have set precedents establishing proper procedure. _Miranda v. Arizona_, 1966 (I will not give full legal citations - those with the expertise will know how to look them up) involved a man identified by the victim of a violent crime, who was interrogated, reportedly without coercion and also without information as to his Constitutional rights (the defendant had relatively little education); he gave a detailed confession and was almost undoubtedly guilty, and was convicted. The Supreme Court ruled that the conviction was improper because it rested on a confession obtained from a suspect who could not exercise his Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, because he did not know about it. Police now must "read [the suspect] their rights" - "You have the right to remain silent ... anything you say will be repeated on television by Jack Webb ..." - the famous "Miranda warning". Today, any confession from a suspect who had not been "Mirandized" (yeah - they use that word) will be disallowed in court unless it was either an "excited utterance" or a "deathbed confession". This does not mean that the trial cannot proceed, but it means that the court presumes a defendant (even a well-educated one who has seen Dragnet) who has not been informed of their rights will have been unfairly taken advantage of. _Brewer v. Williams_, 1976, involved a man who kidnapped and killed a child. He contacted lawyer and was advised not to talk to the police without the lawyer present; he also stated that he would not talk until he had seen his lawyer. His lawyer told police that the defendant would not talk until he had conferred with his new lawyer in the town to which he was being taken for trial; the lawyer was refused permission to ride along with the defendant during the trip. On the ride over, one of the police officers gave the defendant "the Christian burial speech", saying the child's family was very sad that the child's body had not been recovered and how nice it would be if someone would tell them where to find it so they could give it a Christian burial. The deeply religious defendant took leave of his senses and told them where the body was, sealing his own fate in the process. The Supreme Court held that the discussion in the car amounted to manipulation, in that the police knew that the defendant was religious and also had a history of psychiatric illness, and they deliberately worked on him when they had him isolated between his lawyer in the first city and the lawyer waiting for him in the second. His being deprived of advice at that time put him at a disadvantage, and the interrogation was a violation of his right not to incriminate himself. The point here is that he did not *waive* his right not to talk - talking by itself is not evidence that he had made a considered decision to give up his right; if he had said "I've thought about it and decided I don't need a lawyer and now want to talk to you without one ..." it would have been OK, but in the absence of a positive decision to waive the rights to counsel or to silence, unadvised confessions are assumed to be made in ignorance or under manipulation. However, a very similar case(_Rhode Island v Innis_) was upheld. Here police officers expressed concern over the possibility that a gun used in a murder would be found by a child who might hurt themselves; the defendant overheard and told them where to find the gun, after being Mirandized three times before the conversation and once afterwards. The Court held that this was not an "interrogation" and hence did not violate the right to have counsel present; it is apparent that if the Justices thought that the conversation was in fact an interrogation they would have ruled differently. The difference between _Brewer_ and _Innis_ seems to be that in the former the speech was directed *at* the defendant and included a barely-disguised plea for him to confess, while in the latter it seemed to be just a genuine conversation not directed at the defendant. _Katz v United States_, 1967, overturned earlier rulings that wiretapping was not an illegal search and seizure. The case here concerned a defendant suspected of using a pay phone to facilitate illegal business (either drugs or gambling, I forget which). The police wiretapped the public phone in question and listened in to the conversations of everyone who used it, then taped ones by the defendant. The Supreme Court held that there is a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in certain public places, and thus intrusion into these places violates the protection against unlawful searches. The case established two things: that wiretapping is a "search" under the meaning of the Constitution, and that tapping public phones is just as questionable as tapping private ones. (Previous rulings held that telephone conversations were not part of one's house or property and thus were not protected by the Constitution.) In current cases, wiretappings must be undertaken only on a warrant signed by a judge - a "search warrant" just like any other. _North v [somebody]_ - Oliver North's conviction for misleading Congress and obstructing justice was overturned on the grounds that the prosecutors were aided in their search for evidence by testimony under oath from North himself during his appearance before Congressional investigating committees. The spineless committees agreed to "privilege" North's testimony, which meant that it could not be used against him in court; his lawyers then argued that the evidence that was used against him had been contaminated by evidence from his testimony. This illustrates an unusual evidentiary exclusion which seems (to my untutored eye) to have arisen recently. Now that we have investigating committees of various kinds, and the innovation of "privileged testimony", we have that many more opportunities to let people off the hook for what they have not only confessed under duress but *testified to under oath with their own lawyers present*. All the above cases are landmarks which resulted in overturned convictions and the establishment of new procedural protections. What they have also done, of course, is get a lot of other people off since the respective cases, on the grounds that the procedures established in these precedents had been violated. Again, violation is not automatic acquittal, but it may serve to get some evidence thrown out or to lead an appellate judge to agree that the conviction was grossly unfair (which gets the defendant off because they cannot be re-tried under the double jeopardy provision). The legal doctrine which prevails here is "fruit of the poison tree" - a quaint lawyerly saying which means that anything obtained from a tainted source is also tainted and must be avoided. This has led to the "exclusionary rule", an informal rule that any evidence which was obtained in violation of the Constitution or even local police procedural rules (sometimes) must be kept out of the trial. The various complaints you hear about criminals being released on "technicalities" are usually manifestations of the exclusionary rule, but as you can see that rule results from a general principle of law which makes a certain amount of sense in its own right, and from various cases which have hinged on fundamental Constitutional principles. (Occasionally, someone does get off on a true technicality, like the spelling of a name on the docket or the date of filing of charges, but these are just rare screwups.) [Most above cases from _Readings in the Philosophy of Law_, Arthur and Shaw, Prentice-Hall, 1984] ObTrueLegalRarity: A jury voted for "Guilty" but the foreperson signed the ballot on the "Not Guilty" line. Defendant acquitted! Kevin "abuse, maybe, but incrimination, never - thank god for the 5th Amendment" T. Keith